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Abstract—Defending against denial-of-service attacks (DoS)
in a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is challenging because
the network topology is dynamic and nodes are selﬁsh. In this
paper, we propose a DoS mitigation technique that uses digital
signatures to verify legitimate packets, and drop packets that do
not pass the veriﬁcation. Since nodes are selﬁsh, they may not
perform the veriﬁcation in order to avoid paying the overhead. A
bad packet that escapes veriﬁcation along the whole network path
will bring a penalty to all its forwarders. A network game can be
formulated in which nodes along a network path, in optimizing
their own beneﬁts, are encouraged to act collectively to ﬁlter out
bad packets. Analytical results show that Nash equilibrium can
be attained for players in the proposed game, and signiﬁcant
beneﬁts can be provided to forwarders such that many of the
bad packets will be eliminated by veriﬁcation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The dependencies between dynamic, mutually untrusted
neighbors in a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) create
important security concerns in these networks. Among the
attacks documented in the literature, denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks are particularly damaging since both communication
bandwidth and node resources are scarce in MANETs. In
addition to their ability to take down a network quickly, DoS
attacks directed at bandwidth and end node resources are easy
to launch; e.g., by simply injecting useless trafﬁc into the
network.
DoS mitigation techniques designed for wireline networks,
such as traceback by stamping [15], [16] or ﬁltering [8], [2]
packets, and capability based network access [20], [19], will
not work well in an ad hoc environment where the routes and
the set of forwarders on a routing path are highly dynamic
and are selﬁsh.
Secure routing protocols designed for ad hoc networks [7]
build secure routes to support end-to-end communication. If
link layer security is applied [10], these protocols can mitigate
DoS attacks. Illegitimate packets will be discovered as outside
attackers do not know the keys shared between the hops.
However, an inside attacker, i.e., an attacker who is a member
of the end-to-end path, can still launch an attack. Without
using signatures, it is difﬁcult to identify the attacker even if
the attacker is known to be an insider. In addition, in networks
where packet delivery is route-based (e.g., GPSR [9]), these
secure routing protocols cannot be applied because the path
can change from packet to packet.
Motivating nodes to serve each other is another fundamental
issue in MANETs. Speciﬁcally, as communication endpoints
rely on intermediate nodes to forward their trafﬁc, incentives
for the forwarders have to be provided. Traditional incentive
systems have used nuggets [4] and reputation credits [3] to
encourage nodes to function as forwarders. The incentive issue
becomes even more relevant in the security context, when
security measures may require certain nodes to expend more
resources to better defend other nodes. The incentive issue as
it relates to the security issue has been less addressed by the
research community.
Game theory has been applied in MANET for solving the
incentive problem in multi-hop forwarding [5] [21] [6] [17].
In [1], a game model of network attacks is developed for
the interactions between an intrusion detection system (IDS)
and an attacker with dynamic system information. Applying
game theory to induce collaboration between network nodes
for improved security has been less addressed in the literature.
In this work, we propose a DoS mitigating technique for
MANETs that jointly considers the security and incentive is-
sues. The technique is designed to work in a packet-switching
network environment. The idea is based on an attacker’s goal
to avoid detection and being identiﬁed. Hence, we protect
legitimate packets by requiring them to be signed by their
respective senders. A forwarder veriﬁes a packet’s sender
signature when the packet is received. If the veriﬁcation fails,
the packet is dropped. Otherwise, it is forwarded.
We assume that network nodes are selﬁsh but rational.
Incentive for a node to forward packets is given by a reward
the node will obtain after the packets are successfully delivered
to their ﬁnal destinations. A forwarder may also choose to for-
ward a packet without veriﬁcation, since the operation carries
a cost. To motivate a forwarder to verify, a penalty is assessed
for a “lazy” node each time it forwards an attacker packet
that ﬁnally reaches the destination. We will investigate the
properties of the resulting game, as forwarders independently
attempt to play a best forwarding/veriﬁcation strategy that willmaximize their own payoffs, while the network is subject to
given inputs of attacking and legitimate trafﬁc.
Our main contributions in this paper are as follows:
• We propose a signature-based DoS mitigation technique
for packet-switching MANETs.
• We use game theory to study how a system of forwarders
can be motivated to forward good packets while ﬁltering
out bad packets cooperatively by veriﬁcation. We will
propose solutions that address jointly the security and
incentive issues. We will discuss how practical cost
functions can be assigned for sending, forwarding, re-
ceiving, and verifying packets. In addition, we address
implementation issues for an accounting system that will
support the proposed system.
• We present game-theoretic analysis results to investi-
gate the impact of system parameters on the game’s
performance and the resulting behaviors of individual
nodes. The results serve as useful guidelines for network
management.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. In In
Section II, we introduce the use of distributed ﬁltering for DoS
mitigation and discuss its game rationality. In Section III, we
present the detailed formulation of our game-theoretic DoS
mitigation system. In Section IV, we address implementation
issues for the proposed system. Simulation results are pre-
sented in Section V to illustrate the system’s performance.
Section VI concludes.
II. GAME THEORETIC DOS MITIGATION IN MANET
A. Assumptions and attack model
Network Assumptions. We assume that the network con-
sists of a number of ad hoc nodes. The network is loosely
synchronized, e.g, using the method in [14]. Nodes are selﬁsh
but rational. A node can be a receiver (i.e., destination),
a sender (i.e., source), or an intermediate forwarder. Data
packets are delivered from a source towards their destinations
in a packet-switching manner. Connections are multi-hop.
Sessions are short, so no virtual route has to be built for data
delivery. Upon receiving a packet, a forwarder determines its
next hop based on the destination address, and forwards the
packet to the next hop. Determining the next hop is a function
of the routing algorithm, such as position-based routing. As
nodes are mobile, the path between a given source/destination
pair of nodes may change.
Security Assumptions. We assume that a PKI local to
the deployment network is in place when the network is
set up. For example, a trusted party, such as a Certiﬁcation
Authority (CA), possesses a pair of public/private keys, where
the public key is conﬁgured with each ad hoc node. Each
ad hoc node also possesses a pair of public/private keys. The
public key is certiﬁed by the CA, and is paired with the node’s
identity. Although there may exist an end-to-end symmetric
key between a source and a destination, we do not assume link
layer symmetric keys between any two neighboring nodes; i.e.,
the link level information is transmitted in plain text. Lastly,
we assume that the network is aware of the severity of the
DoS attack; i.e., an approximate fraction of the total packets
that are attack packets.
Payment Model. We assume that there is an off-line
accounting system that handles the payment/penalty with
respect to data delivery. The payment is well deﬁned for each
transaction conducted by ad hoc users. We assume that the
accounting system is strong enough to distinguish a legitimate
ad hoc user from a cheater who claims credits that it does not
deserve. Implementation issues for the accounting system are
discussed in Section IV.
Attack Model. We assume that a number of attackers,
which are otherwise ordinary ad hoc nodes1, may inject
trafﬁc (i.e., bad packets) in the network to trigger a DoS
attack. The impact of the attack is two-fold: (1) it consumes
excessive receiver resources by, say, creating a large number
of computing processes at the receiver; and (2) it consumes
excessive network bandwidth to congest the target network. In
this paper, we focus on the case when an attacker randomly
selects victims. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, we assume that the
attackers do not collude. Other attacks such as packet dropping
and packet manipulation are orthogonal to the jamming attack,
and are not covered in this work.
B. Mitigating DoS in MANET
We require that packets from legitimate sources be digitally
signed by their respective senders. Other than the network level
routing information and the application level data payload,
each packet will carry a signature (SIG), which includes the
hash result of the packet signed by the private key of its source
and a certiﬁcate for the corresponding public key. The signed
SIG with the certiﬁcate is used to verify that the packet is from
the claimed legitimate source. If the SIG carried in the packet
does not match the SIG that a forwarder generates from the
received packet, the packet is classiﬁed as a bad packet and
therefore dropped.
1) Against Replay Attack: The signature-based defense is
prone to the replay attack. An attacker can replay a legitimate
packet a large number of times to generate a high load of
useless trafﬁc. These packets will pass the veriﬁcation step.
To deal with the replay attack, a packet should be stamped
with its generation time. In addition, each packet has a given
lifetime. A packet whose lifetime has expired will be dropped.
To prevent a malicious node from sending a legitimate packet
to different next hops during the packet’s lifetime, a neighbor
monitoring technique can be used.
In neighbor monitoring, a node reads the complete header,
including both the SIG and network level headers, of every
packet even if the node is not the packet’s next hop. The
node stores the header read until the corresponding packet’s
lifetime expires. Upon hearing a packet whose lifetime has
not expired, the node will compare the header read with the
headers currently in the node’s local store. By doing this, the
node can detect a replayed packet and drop it before further
1That is, the attackers are not superior to ordinary ad hoc nodes.damage to the network happens. Since only the packet header,
but not the whole packet, has to be read, the cost of monitoring
can be kept low. If the packet lifetime is not too long, which is
normally the case in ad hoc networks, a node will not need to
store too many packet headers, which reduces the storage cost.
Note that the monitoring technique will not be effective in a
wireline network if attackers select different routes for sending
different replayed packets, since one forwarder will then be
unable to monitor packets destined for another forwarder.
As shown in Fig. 1 in a two-dimensional plane, we illus-
trate how neighbor monitoring mitigates non-collusive replay
attacks in a network with high node density. If position-based
routing is used for packet delivery, as the node density is
high, the path for any packet delivery can be approximated
as a straight line, and the geographical distance for each hop
is approximately the same as the maximum range of radio
transmission, denoted as R. For example, when a forwarder
F at (0,0) wishes to send a packet to the destination D, it may
do so through a next hop N, where FN ≈ R. When neighbor
monitoring is applied, any node that is no more than distance
R from the path (i.e., ... → F → N... → D) will be aware of
the packet’s forwarding to N. In Fig. 1, any node located in
the shaded rectangular area knows about the forwarding.
F(0,0)￿ D￿ N￿
R￿
M’’￿
V’￿
M(x,y)￿
V￿
M’￿ R￿
Y￿
X￿
Fig. 1. Mitigating replay attack using neighbor monitoring.
We assume that a malicious attacker at M(x,y) intercepts
the packet from the forwarder located at F. To avoid detection
of the replayed packet by any node located in the shaded area
in Fig. 1, the attacker would ﬁnd a node that is the farthest
from the packet’s delivery path as the next hop. We assume that
this next hop is located at V . Consequently, MV ≈ R. Note
that MV is perpendicular to FD. As V is well behaving, it
will forward the packet towards D following the path FD. The
replayed packet will be discovered once it crosses the point
V ′ (i.e., on entering the shaded area in Fig. 1). Hence, how
successful the replay attack is depends on the ratio between
V V ′ and V D, which measures the fraction of the attacking
path completed before the packet is identiﬁed as a replayed
packet. When M is located at different locations within F′s
transmission range, the average value of V V
′
V D indicates how
successfully the neighboring monitoring can defend against
the replay attack.
As nodes are uniformly distributed in the network, the
probability density function that the attacker receiving the data
packet from F is located in any area within F′s transmission
range can be obtained as 1
πR2. As V V
′
V D = V M
′
V M′′ =
y
1+R,
denoting the average value of V V
′
V D as [V V
′
V D ]avg, we have
[
V V ′
V D
]avg = 2
Z R
−R
Z √
R2−x2
0
1
πR2
y
y + R
dydx. (1)
The fraction [V V
′
V D ]avg can then be calculated numerically,
and is equal to 0.273. This means that the replayed packet can
be discovered at a relatively early point of the attacking path.
In particular, if the path has a hop count of no more than 3,
the replayed packet can be discovered whenever the next hop
of the attacker, V , forwards it on.
Neighbor monitoring can also mitigate collusive attacks. An
attacker may send copies of a legitimate packet to collusive
partners at different locations. Still, the colluding partners can
only successfully send the replayed packet once.
Neighbor monitoring is not bullet proof. A highly mobile
attacker may be able to move to a new network area in a
short time, and successfully replay a packet within the packet’s
lifetime. A node may also use a smart antenna to prevent nodes
in the neighborhood from overhearing a transmitted packet.
Nevertheless, the cost and difﬁculty of successfully launching
an attack in these cases are signiﬁcantly increased.
Fig. 2 shows the proposed packet format. In the ﬁgure, the
previous hop is the node forwarding the packet, and the next
hop is the node designated as the receiver of the forwarded
packet.
Previous￿
hop￿
Next￿
hop￿
Source￿
address￿
Destination￿
address￿
Sequence￿
number￿
Timestamp￿ Data￿ SIG￿
Hashed and signed￿
Fig. 2. packet format.
If every forwarder veriﬁes packets before forwarding them,
any attack trafﬁc will be discovered and dropped to limit its
damage to the network. In particular, end servers are expected
not to receive any attack packet. Network bandwidth will also
be largely protected. However, verifying every packet at every
forwarder causes unnecessarily high loads at the forwarders,
especially when a large fraction of the packets is legitimate.
To reduce the costs of veriﬁcation, without severely com-
promising its effectiveness, a forwarder may decide to proba-
bilistically verify a packet. Since nodes are selﬁsh, we need to
incentivize them to verify with sufﬁciently high probabilities.
C. Incentives and game rationality
We apply a reward system in which nodes are given credit
for acting as forwarders. Speciﬁcally, a forwarder is credited
for forwarding a packet if the packet successfully arrives at the
destination. We assume the existence of an accounting system,
similar to a “central bank”, for securely keeping track of the
rewards, and preventing false rewards from being claimed.
In our DoS mitigation approach, the SIG of each forwarded
packet is stored at the forwarder. The stored SIGs can bepresented to the accounting system as evidence for collecting
rewards.
In the DoS resilient forwarding game, a node’s payoff is the
reward for forwarding minus the forwarding costs. The costs
account for all expended resources in the forwarding, such as
the energy consumed for packet receive and transmission, and
for performing any required cryptographic operation.
In the DoS defense, forwarders verify the SIGs of received
packets. A selﬁsh forwarder may try to maximize its payoff by
not verifying, but rely on another forwarder on the packet’s
route to verify and accomplish the job of ﬁltering out any
attack packet. Clearly, if every forwarder reasons in the same
way and avoids all veriﬁcation, then all attack packets will be
allowed to reach their destinations. To avoid the degeneration
of the DoS defense into a system in which no veriﬁcation is
performed at all, a forwarder is punished for forwarding a bad
packet that successfully makes it to the destination. Hence,
if a forwarder presents the SIG of a bad packet in claiming
its reward, a penalty instead of a reward will be given. The
penalty subtracts from the node’s total credit for forwarding
other good packets.
We formulate the DoS resilient packet forwarding system
as a multiplayer game between forwarder nodes in a MANET.
Forwarder nodes take part in the same game if they are on the
same route between a sender and receiver. Since routes in
a MANET can be highly dynamic, the set of nodes playing
against each other can change often. As discussed, a player’s
payoff in the game is its reward for forwarding the good
packets, less its penalty for forwarding the bad packets and
its costs of forwarding and veriﬁcation. A player’s strategy
is its probability of verifying a received packet. The player’s
strategy may be adaptive so that the probability of veriﬁcation
may change over time.
III. GAME FORMULATION
We now formulate the formal game. We ﬁrst deﬁne the
reward, cost, and penalty of the game. We will then discuss
a simple two-player extensive game, under both perfect and
imperfect information. We will further generalize the two-
player game into an n-player game in which there are n
forwarder nodes along a network path. Notice that in our
game formulation, we consider only the strategies of rational
forwarders and how they interact with each other; in particular,
an attacker is not considered a player in the game.
A. Reward, cost, and penalty
A forwarder may perform the following operations: (1)
forwarding a packet without veriﬁcation, (2) verifying and
forwarding a legitimate packet, and (3) verifying and dropping
a bad packet. Let G be the reward for a forwarder if it has
forwarded a legitimate packet, and the packet is successfully
delivered to the destination. Let cp be the penalty for a
forwarder if it has forwarded a bad packet without veriﬁcation,
and the packet reaches its destination. Let cr, ct, and cv be the
costs for packet receive, transmit, and signature veriﬁcation,
respectively.
When a forwarder forwards a legitimate packet, its payoffs
are g1 = G−cr −ct and g2 = G−cr −ct −cv for the cases
of no veriﬁcation and veriﬁcation, respectively. If a forwarder
veriﬁes a bad packet and then drops it, the forwarder has a
payoff of g3 = −(cr+cv). If a forwarder forwards a bad packet
without veriﬁcation, its payoff is either (1) g4 = −(cr+ct), if
the packet is veriﬁed and dropped by a forwarder later in the
route, or (2) g5 = −cp − cr − ct, if the packet ﬁnally arrives
at the destination.
The different cases of payoffs for a forwarder are summa-
rized in Tabel I.
TABLE I
PAYOFFS FOR DIFFERENT CASES.
g1 = G − cr − ct a good packet without veriﬁcation
g2 = G − cr − ct − cv a good packet with veriﬁcation
g3 − cr − cv a bad packet with veriﬁcation
g4 = −cr − ct a bad packet without veriﬁcation yet
it is veriﬁed by following forwarders
g5 = −cp − cr − ct a bad packet without veriﬁcation and
the packet reaches the destination
B. Two-player game
We now analyze a simple game scenario. The game involves
two players, which may be the last forwarder and the second
last forwarder on a route (see Fig. 3). In this game, we call the
second last forwarder the previous hop, and the last forwarder
the next hop.
Previous hop￿ Next hop￿ Destination￿
Fig. 3. A two-player game illustration.
1) Game with perfect information: We ﬁrst consider the
case that the next hop is aware of the previous hop’s action.
This can be achieved by having the previous hop label the
packet, to indicate whether it has veriﬁed the packet’s signature
or not.
The game is an extensive game, and can be illustrated as in
Fig. 4. We denote by V the strategy of veriﬁcation before
forwarding, and by F the strategy of forwarding without
veriﬁcation. Let Gm−xy be the payoff for node m (m is either
the previous hop p or the next hop n), when the previous
hop uses strategy x and the next hop uses strategy y. For
example, Gp−vf is the payoff for the previous hop if it veriﬁes
the packet and the next hop forwards the packet without
veriﬁcation. Let patt be the probability that a packet is a
bad packet. The payoffs for the two players under different
combinations of strategies are summarized in Table II.
We use backward induction to solve the game. Consider the
subgame in which the previous hop veriﬁes a received packet.
As for a forwarder, if the payoff without veriﬁcation is always
higher than that with veriﬁcation (i.e., Gn−vf > Gn−vv), then
the next hop will always select forwarding (F). On the other
hand, in the subgame in which the previous hop forwards theP￿
vv￿ -￿ n￿ vv￿ -￿ p￿ ,￿G￿ G￿
vf￿ -￿ n￿ vf￿ -￿ p￿ ,￿G￿ G￿
fv￿ -￿ n￿ fv￿ -￿ p￿ ,￿G￿ G￿
ff￿ -￿ n￿ ff￿ -￿ p￿ ,￿G￿ G￿
V￿
F￿
F￿
V￿
F￿
V￿
N￿
N￿
Fig. 4. Extensive game with perfect information.
TABLE II
EXPECTED PAYOFFS FOR THE PREVIOUS AND NEXT HOPS.
Gp−vv (1 − patt)g2 + pattg3 Gn−vv (1 − patt)g2
Gp−vf (1 − patt)g2 + pattg3 Gn−vf (1 − patt)g1
Gp−fv (1 − patt)g1 + pattg4 Gn−fv (1 − patt)g2 + pattg3
Gp−ff (1 − patt)g1 + pattg5 Gn−ff (1 − patt)g1 + pattg5
packet without veriﬁcation, if Gn−fv > Gn−ff, then the next
hop will select veriﬁcation (V ). Otherwise, the next hop will
forward the packet. As shown in Tables I and Table II, the
condition for Gn−fv > Gn−ff is given as cv < patt(cP +cf).
Now we determine what strategy the previous hop should
select. When cv < patt(cp + cf), the action pair for the next
hop is FV . For the previous hop, its choice will depend on the
comparison between Gp−vf and Gp−fv. As Gp−fv > Gp−vf
is always true in this case, the previous hop should forward the
packet without veriﬁcation. Hence, a Nash equilibrium strategy
pair for the two players is (F,V ).
When cv > patt(cp+cf), the action pair for the next hop is
FF. As Gp−ff > Gp−vf, the previous hop will also select F.
A Nash equlibrium strategy pair for the two players is (F,F).
Whether the next hop will verify the packet or not depends
on the comparison between cv and patt(cp+cf). As cv and cf
are ﬁxed values, the decision depends on patt and cp. When
patt becomes larger, it is more likely that the next hop will
verify the packet. On the other hand, if we want the next
hop to verify the packet with a higher probability (e.g., the
server requires that most bad packets should be discovered
and dropped in the network), then the value of cp should be
larger.
The game results show that the previous hop will always
forward the packet, and will leave the task of veriﬁcation to the
next hop. This may not be fair. In addition, from the network
point of view, it is desirable for the previous hop to verify
the packet, because this will limit the bandwidth wasted in
transmitting the packet. To motivate the previous hop to verify,
the penalty cp can be adjusted. For any bad packet that reaches
the destination, we may charge an extra penalty cbandwidth
for the previous hop. The payoff Gp−ff in Tabel II is then
adjusted, and now becomes (1−patt)g1+patt(g5−cbandwidth).
The adjusted payoff will not change the strategies of the
players when cv < patt(cp + cf). However, when cv >
patt(cp+cf), the previous hop will select V if cv < patt(cp+
cf + cbandwidth), and F otherwise.
2) Game with imperfect information: The game with
perfect information leads to an “unfair” game at equilibrium
since most of the work will be forced upon the next hop.
In addition, a packet label of V or F by the previous hop
will have to be trusted, or be veriﬁed as well, which brings
additional cost.
In this subsection, we analyze the case when the next hop
does not know about the previous hop’s action. Without the
knowledge, the next hop will have to guess whether a packet
has been veriﬁed or not. For illustration, we will assume
that the guess is ﬁfty-ﬁfty; i.e., it will have a 0.5 probability
of being incorrect. The imperfect information game can be
analyzed as a strategy game with a chance play. The game is
illustrated in Fig. 5.
vv￿ -￿ n￿ vv￿ -￿ p￿ ,￿G￿ G￿ vf￿ -￿ n￿ vf￿ -￿ p￿ ,￿G￿ G￿ fv￿ -￿ n￿ fv￿ -￿ p￿ ,￿G￿ G￿ ff￿ -￿ n￿ ff￿ -￿ p￿ ,￿G￿ G￿
ff￿ -￿ n￿ ff￿ -￿ p￿ ,￿G￿ G￿
V￿ F￿ V￿ F￿
V￿ F￿ V￿ F￿
V￿ F￿
V￿
F￿ F￿
V￿
P￿
N￿
N￿
Chance￿ Chance￿
0.5￿
0.5￿ 0.5￿
0.5￿
vv￿ -￿ n￿ vv￿ -￿ p￿ ,￿G￿ G￿ vf￿ -￿ n￿ vf￿ -￿ p￿ ,￿G￿ G￿ fv￿ -￿ n￿ fv￿ -￿ p￿ ,￿G￿ G￿
Fig. 5. Extensive game with imperfect information.
We denote by X/Y the case that the next hop selects
strategy X based on a discovered signal of Y , where Y is the
next hop’s guess for the previous hop’s action. For example,
V/F denotes the case that the next hop veriﬁes the packet
based on its judgment that the previous hop has forwarded the
packet without veriﬁcation.
Let (Gp(Z,X/Y ), Gn(Z,X/Y )) be the payoff pair for the
previous and next hops, when the next hop uses strategy X
based on signal Y , while the previous hop’s actual strategy is
Z (where Z can be either X or Y ). For example, Gp(V,F/V )
is the payoff for the previous hop when it uses strategy V ,
while the next hop uses strategy F upon the discovered signal
V .
According to Fig. 5, the expected payoff for each player
depends on their chosen strategies, and not on the signals
discovered by the next hop. For example,
Gp(V,V/F) = Gp(V,V/V ) = 0.5 ∗ Gp−vv + 0.5 ∗ Gp−fv; (2)
Gn(V,V/F) = Gn(V,V/V ) = 0.5 ∗ Gn−vv + 0.5 ∗ Gn−fv.
The strategy form for this game can thus be simpliﬁed as in
Table III. The ﬁrst column shows the possible strategies for theprevious hop, and the ﬁrst row shows the possible strategies
for the next hop.
TABLE III
STRATEGIC FORM OF THE EXTENSIVE GAME WITH IMPERFECT
INFORMATION.
V F
V Gp−vv,Gn−vv Gp−vf,Gn−pf
F Gp−fv,Gn−fv Gp−ff,Gn−ff
The extensive game is then exactly the same as a strategic
game in which the two players make their moves simultane-
ously. Let p∗ be the probability that the previous hop veriﬁes
the packet, and q∗ be the probability that the next hop veriﬁes
the packet, and the mixed strategies based on p∗ and q∗ will
lead to a Nash equilibrium of the game. Using the standard
procedure [13], we can obtain p∗ and q∗ as follows:
p∗ =
Gn−ff − Gn−fv
Gn−ff + Gn−vv − Gn−fv − Gn−vf
(3)
q∗ =
Gp−ff − Gp−vf
Gp−ff + Gp−vv − Gp−fv − Gp−vf
When p∗ < 0 or q∗ < 0, the respective best strategies of the
previous and next hops are the pure strategies of forwarding
without veriﬁcation. Notice that in Eqn. (3), the denominators
of both fractions are the same. Therefore, when p∗ is 0, q∗ is
also 0. This means that when the network attack severity (i.e.,
patt) or penalty (i.e., cp) changes, both players will switch
from the pure strategy F to mixed strategies simultaneously.
Notice that p∗ = 0 or q∗ = 0 only when cv = patt(cp + ct).
Therefore, in the extensive game with imperfect information,
when cv ≥ patt(cp+ct), both players will use a pure strategy.
When cv < patt(cp + ct), a mixed strategy will be used; the
previous hop veriﬁes a packet with probability p∗, and the next
hop veriﬁes a packet with probability q∗.
We have solved the case in which the guess has a 0.5 chance
of being wrong. The approach in [13] can be used to solve
the game under a general chance value.
C. n-player game
In formulating the n player game, we assume that each
forwarder on a network path knows that the path has n hops.
However, a forwarder does not know its position on the path;
i.e., it does not know how many hops it is away from the
source or the destination. In the game, each forwarder plays
against the other n − 1 forwarders. Since all the forwarders
know the same information, they are treated as homogeneous
and hence will use the same strategy.
We assume that upon receiving a packet, a forwarder
veriﬁes the packet with probability pv. Nash equilibrium will
be reached only if under pv, the expected payoff for the
forwarder remains the same whether it veriﬁes the packet or
not. Mathematically, the relationship can be given as follows:
(1 − patt)g2 + pattg3 = (1 − patt)g1 + (4)
patt((1 − pv)n−1g5 + (1 − (1 − pv)n−1)g4).
The left hand side is the expected payoff when the forwarder
veriﬁes the packet. The right hand side is the expected payoff
when it does not verify the packet, while the remaining
forwarders will verify with probability pv. The number of
forwarders on the path is n. Based on Eqn. (4), pv can be
calculated as
pv = 1 − (
(1 − patt)(g2 − g1) + patt(g3 − g4)
patt(g5 − g4)
)
1
n−1 (5)
The expected payoff of a player in this game can be
calculated as
G = (1 − patt)g2 + pattg3. (6)
Notice that the expected payoff of each forwarder is the
same as the expected payoff if the forwarder veriﬁes every
packet. However, under the proposed game, a forwarder ob-
tains the same gain with less consumed resources because the
payoff deduction is partially caused by the penalty. This keeps
the forwarders operational in the network for a longer time,
by conserving nodal resources.
For comparison, we now calculate the optimum payoff
for a forwarder assuming that nodes are not selﬁsh but will
collaborate for the common good. Suppose that each forwarder
veriﬁes a packet with probability p. The expected payoff for
a forwarder is then
Gavg = (1 − patt)g2 + pattg3 (7)
+ (1 − patt)g1 + patt((1 − p)n−1g5 + (1 − (1 − p)n−1)g4).
By differentiating the right hand side of Eqn. 7 and setting
it equal to 0, we can solve the equation and obtain the
probability of veriﬁcation that will maximize the forwarder’s
payoff. Denoting the optimal probability by poptimum, we have
poptimum = 1 − (
(1 − patt)(g2 − g1) + patt(g3 − g4)
npatt(g5 − g4)
)
1
n−1.
(8)
IV. DISCUSSIONS
We now address implementation issues for realizing the
proposed signature-based DoS defense system. Our purpose
is to elucidate the technical issues involved, and to propose a
solution approach that is promising though preliminary. We
do not claim to have resolved all the issues in the most
effective/efﬁcient manner, and further research is needed to
fully characterize the system implementation and evaluate the
systems tradeoffs.A. Accounting system
An accounting system is essential for determining the
rewards of forwarders and the payments by destinations. The
system can operate off-line. In our system, a forwarder collects
the hash results2 of packets that it has forwarded, and present
them to the accounting system. After the accounting system
authenticates the claimer, it then veriﬁes the hash results based
on delivery records (provided by the packet destinations) of
both the good and bad packets. Rewards or penalties are then
calculated for the forwarders.
How can we prevent cheating by a forwarder who claims
false credit? As it is difﬁcult to establish secure link layer
communication between any two mobile ad hoc nodes, the
link layer encryption may not be used. In this case, a cheater
can generate hash results even without doing the forwarding
work because it can intercept packets transmitted within its
receiving range. The cheating discovery method in [11] then
will not work. An accounting system embedded in hardware
[4] will not work either, as a cheater may choose to receive
a packet and forward it, even though it is not on the network
path.
We propose a statistical method to discover conventional
cheaters. A conventional cheater is deﬁned as an ad hoc
node that “lives on” cheating; i.e., it claims a large amount
of credits that are not deserved. In our method to prevent
cheating, a forwarder keeps not only a record of the packet
signatures forwarded, but also their path information including
the packet’s previous hop and next hop. A forwarder sends the
stored path information to the accounting system. In this case,
the accounting system can verify the paths of delivered data
based on the reports by all the forwarders. Note that the path
veriﬁcation is only needed when there are conﬂict claims.
The basic method to prevent cheating is vulnerable to a
collusive attack as shown in Fig. 6. In the ﬁgure, Attacker
1 records its collusive partner, Attacker 2, as the next hop,
instead of recording the real next hop. If the partner is close
enough to the real next hop, it can identify the node to which
the next hop forwards the packet. The partner will then be
able to claim (false) credit for the forwarding.
Attacker2￿
Attacker1￿
Victim￿
Fig. 6. A collusive attack on the accounting system to claim false credits.
A defense against the collusion is as follows. Whenever
the accounting system has more than one node showing the
same path payment information, it will hold the payment
and, at the same time, keeps the nodes in a questionable
list. Statistically, attackers may cheat repeatedly. Therefore,
the frequency at which a cheater is added to the questionable
2A forwarder generates the hash results upon receiving a packet.
list will be signiﬁcantly higher than that of a legitimate node.
The accounting system can then use the frequency information
to identify a cheater with high accuracy. After identifying the
attacker, the accounting system pays the legitimate forwarders.
B. Setting game parameters
The costs of packet send, receive, and signature veriﬁcation
should be set based on the resources consumed. Among the
resources, energy is critical because unlike other resources
such as storage and CPU cycles, energy of mobile nodes
can be difﬁcult or impossible to replenish. Therefore, energy
consumption can be a deciding factor for determining the costs
of network operations. Similarly, the relative costs of send,
receive, and signature veriﬁcation can be compared based on
their energy consumption [12], [18].
The reward for each forwarder after the successful delivery
of a good packet should depend on the beneﬁts the delivery
brings to the source or destination. It may also be determined
by the network’s desire to encourage a node to act as a
forwarder. In this paper, we set the reward for each forwarder
as a constant value, regardless of the number of forwarders on
the path. The decision is reasonable because more network
resources are consumed when there are more forwarders,
hence justifying a higher payment by the destination.
The value of penalty can be determined based on damage
to the server or network when a bad packet reaches the target.
The penalty can also be used by the accounting system to
affect the willingness of a forwarder to verify packets. To make
the game more efﬁcient, we propose to set the penalty as a
function of patt, so that when patt is higher, the penalty value
is higher. This is because the more serious the attack, the more
we would like a forwarder to verify a packet. We study the
use of a linear and an exponential function, to express the
relationship between the penalty and the severity of attack.
When using a linear function, the penalty can be calculated
as:
cp = c1 + kpatt. (9)
When using an exponential function, the penalty can be
calculated as:
cp = c1ekpatt. (10)
These two functions are applied by the system to control
the behaviors of individual nodes. The goal is to have a high
enough penalty to reduce the number of bad packets received
by a server to an acceptable level. However, the penalty value
should not be too high. Otherwise, network nodes will not
be motivated to act as forwarders, because they cannot obtain
a sufﬁcient payoff for doing so. As a special case, when k
equals 0, the penalties computed by both of the equations are
constants.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We quantify the costs of packet send, receive, and veriﬁ-
cation as their amounts of energy consumption. We use the
experimental values reported in [12], [18]. We set the length
of a packet as 1000 bytes. We normalize the costs by the powerconsumption of a packet receive (i.e., one packet receive has
cost one). The costs of send and veriﬁcation (including hashing
and RSA veriﬁcation) are then 1.5 and 10, respectively. For
illustration, we set the reward and penalty values to be 20
and 60, respectively. In future work, these costs will have to
be reﬁned to model speciﬁc systems. Where applicable, the
extra penalty (see Section III-B1) for forwarding a bad packet,
cbandwidth, is set to be 3. The number of forwarders on a path,
n, is set to be 3. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, patt = 0.2.
The baseline values of the game parameters are summarized
in Table IV.
TABLE IV
GAME PARAMETER SETTINGS
cr ct cv G cp n patt cbandwidth
1 1.5 10 20 60 4 0.2 3
A. Two-player game
We ﬁrst examine the game with perfect information. In
Fig. 7, we show the payoffs for the previous and next hops,
respectively, as the probability of a bad packet patt changes.
When patt is small, the payoffs for both players decrease
as patt increases. When patt reaches the threshold point of
cv
cp+cf = 0.1639, the payoff for the previous hop will jump
to a high value because the second hop switches its strategy
from F to V . After the threshold point, both payoffs again
decrease as patt increases. In Fig. 8, we show the payoffs
when network loss is considered. There are two threshold
values: patt = 0.1639 and cv
cp+cf+cbandwidth = 0.1550. When
patt = 0.1550, there is a large increase in the next hop’s payoff
because the previous hop changes its strategy from F to V .
At patt = 0.1639, the payoff for the previous hop has a large
increase while, at the same time, the payoff for the next hop
decreases signiﬁcantly. The reason is that the previous hop
changes its strategy from V to F, while the next hop changes
its strategy from F to V . In both games, the probability that
a packet received by the destination is a bad packet is patt if
both hops use strategy F, and 0 if any of them uses strategy
V .
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Fig. 7. Previous hop and next hop payoffs with perfect information.
In Fig. 9 we show, for a game with imperfect information
at Nash equilibrium, the probabilities that the previous hop
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Fig. 8. Payoffs with perfect information: The case of extra penalty.
and next hop will verify a packet, respectively. When patt is
low, both of the players will use the pure strategy F because
it is dominant. When patt ≥ 0.1639, both players switch to a
mixed strategy. The probability that a player veriﬁes the packet
increases when the attack becomes more severe. In Fig. 10, we
show the expected payoffs for the two players. Both payoffs
decrease as the attack gets more severe.
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Fig. 9. Probabilities of veriﬁcation under different percentages of bad packets.
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Fig. 10. Payoffs under different percentages of bad packets.B. n-player game
Fig. 11 shows that when patt increases, a node has to verify
packets more often in order to reach Nash equilibrium. Note
that a player will use the mixed strategy when patt ≥ 0.1639,
and the probability of veriﬁcation increases as the attack gets
more severe.
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Fig. 11. Probabilities of veriﬁcation at Nash equilibrium.
In Fig. 12, we show the payoff for a forwarder as patt
changes, and in Fig. 13, we show the probabilities that a
bad packet can reach the destination. For comparison, we also
show the cases (1) when the best strategies are used under
the assumption that the nodes are collaborative, and (2) when
the worst strategy is used so that all the nodes simply forward
packets without any veriﬁcation.
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Fig. 12. Payoffs at Nash equilibrium.
Fig. 14 shows how a forwarder may change its strategy
as the penalty value changes. As the penalty becomes high, a
forwarder will more likely verify the packet to avoid a negative
payoff. Note that when the probability of receiving a bad
packet is the same, the expected payoff at Nash equilibrium
for any player remains the same even if the penalty value
changes. In Fig. 15, we show the probability that a bad packet
will successfully arrive at the destination. This probability
decreases as the penalty value increases.
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Fig. 13. Probabilities that a bad packet will successful arrive at its destination.
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Fig. 14. Impact of penalty on decision of a forwarder.
C. Summary of observations
Based on the numerical results, we summarize the important
observations as follows:
• In a two player game, the game with perfect information
to the numerical results. will generate higher payoffs
for both players. However, the perfect information will
cause the next hop to do all the veriﬁcation work. In
contrast, the game with imperfect information can cause
the previous hop to share some of the veriﬁcation work,
which is desirable for conservation of global network
bandwidth.
• Players (i.e., the forwarders) will change their strategies
when patt reaches certain threshold values. This is be-
cause when patt is low, the gain from veriﬁcation is not
enough to compensate for its costs. It is interesting that
in all the games studied in this paper, the threshold value
of patt at which a player will change its strategy is the
same and is equal to cv
cp+cf . The common threshold value
is a function of the forwarding cost, the veriﬁcation cost,
and the penalty. The costs of forwarding and veriﬁcation
should be determined by the resource consumption of the0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
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Fig. 15. Impact of penalty on DoS mitigation.
operations, instead of by policy. The tunable parameter
to obtain certain desired game results is therefore the
penalty value. For example, to motivate a forwarder to
verify more often, we can use a larger penalty value.
• In the n-player game, the payoff for a forwarder decreases
as the attack becomes more severe. The proposed game
helps mitigate DoS because the probability for a bad
packet to reach its destination decreases even as the attack
becomes worse. This indicates that the effectiveness of
the DoS mitigation game increases as the attack becomes
more severe.
• In the n-player game, the payoff for each forwarder is
ﬁxed (see Eqn. (6)). When the penalty value is high
enough, the probability for a bad packet to reach the
destination can be reduced to a small value. However, the
resources (e.g., nodal energy) consumed at a forwarder
will be more, and hence the nodes will have a shorter
lifetime if the resources are not replenishable. Therefore,
the penalty value should be properly selected to keep the
rate of successful attack low and at the mean time, to
motivate forwarders.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed a signature-based DoS mitigation system
for mobile ad hoc networks. The system deﬁnes a game in
which forwarders will probabilistically verify packets received
for forwarding, and hence will have a chance to drop bad
packets sent by attackers. We have formulated different forms
of the game for different network scenarios, and analyzed
the corresponding payoff, effectiveness, and Nash equilibrium
properties. Based on our analysis and numerical results, it can
be concluded that the games can induce useful DoS mitigation
effects. In addition, key game parameters, such as the penalty
for forwarding a bad packet without veriﬁcation, can affect the
probability that a node will verify a received packet. Therefore,
determining the value for the penalty can be effective for game
control.
Future work includes experiments under more involved
operating scenarios, and the design of protocols to accurately
estimate the severity of attack. It would also be interesting to
investigate the existence and attainment of Nash equilibrium
when a forwarder does not know the length of the network
path. Finally, issues of determining realistic reward and penalty
values under speciﬁc deployment scenarios should be studied.
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